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STATEMENT OF IURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1953 as amended) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction 
in appeals from a court of record in criminal cases. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
• Whether the trial court properly admitted Officer DeGraw's testimony 
relating to the recorded message? 
Standard of Review: Issues of law are reviewed under a correctness standard, 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). 
• Whether the trial court erred in ruling that questions regarding the 
defendant's visitation order were irrelevant? 
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether 
proffered evidence is relevant and the [appellate court] will find error in a relevancy 
ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 
769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) cert denied 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1991); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989). 
• Whether the trial court erred in denying Denier's motion to dismiss 
after the City had presented its case? 
Standard of Review: The Court "review[s] the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the 
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jury." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous cases). The 
verdict of the jury will be reversed for insufficient evidence only when the "evidence 
... is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." Id. 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following Utah Rules of Evidence are relevant to the determination of this 
matter: 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence". 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence 
inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. 
A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. 
A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
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the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. 
A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person 
made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) 
the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or 
(B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, 
or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the 
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during 
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable-
fa] Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in 
which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying 
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or. 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or. 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; 
or. 
[4] is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then 
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or. 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has 
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable 
means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of 
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of 
the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the 
witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
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declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same 
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the 
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony 
is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or 
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's 
death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so 
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to 
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the 
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement 
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the 
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, 
adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history, 
even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the 
matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, 
of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or 
marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to 
have accurate information concerning the matter declare^. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Catherine Samuel (hereinafter "Samuel") and defendant/appellant James 
Denier (hereinafter "Denier") have a child in common. At the time of the trial Samuel 
had known Denier for approximately fourteen years. Trial Transcript, (hereinafter 
TT), 150: 53 (3). Samuel sought and obtained a protective order in 1998. TT 
150:102 (1). 
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The protective order prohibits Denier from contacting Samuel or having any 
one else contact her directly or indirectly. The protective order allows Denier to 
contact Samuel regarding visitation. TT 150:108 (18-19). 
On or about December 30, 2007, Samuel was at her home located in the 
Avenues in Salt Lake City. TT 150: 50 (8). Late that morning several of Samuel's 
friends called her after Denier had called them and was not polite to them. They told 
her "You need to call him." TT 150:49 (16-19). 
Samuel then called Denier to request that he not call her friends (TT 150: 49 
(16-17) & 50 (8,17)) and stated that there was "nothing in my order that stipulates 
that I have to tell him when I go out of town with my child." TT 150: 49 (5-7) & 150: 
60 (10). It was Samuel's weekend with her son. TT 150: 49 (8-10). She also told 
Denier that she felt that he was stalking her. TT: 150: 49 (17). 
Denier became very angry and screamed and swore when Samuel asked him 
not to call her or her friends. He used the F-word and said that he could do whatever 
he wanted and he needed to know where Samuel was at all times. TT 150: 50 (17-
19). Shortly after that conversation Samuel called Denier back and told him that it 
was not okay for him to yell or swear at her over the telephone and that she 
considered it harassment. TT 150: 51 (8-10). 
Denier called back at approximately five twenty on December 30, 2007. TT 
150: 51 (16, 21). Samuel did not answer her telephone as she knew Denier would be 
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angry, that he would yell at her, that she had been yelled at enough and that he 
would leave a message. TT: 150: 52 (7-9). Samuel had not asked Denier to call her 
back for anything. TT 150: 52 [10). 
Samuel checked her telephone messages a short while later and there was a 
message. TT 150: 52 (13). 
Samuel, who has known Denier for fourteen years and who had on many 
occasions listened to his voice, said that she was familiar with his voice and that the 
message on the telephone was from Denier. TT 150: 52 (20-22) & 53 (1-7). She 
further stated that she also had caller ID on her telephone. TT 150: 53(10). 
On the message Denier left for Samuel, he stated, "I know that this phone call is 
being recorded." TT 150: 53(18-19). He then stated, "Go ahead and take me to 
court, like you have three or four times in the past eight or nine years. Go ahead and 
make a spectacle of yourself because I've always been found innocent." TT 150: 
53(20-22). Further he said, "You don't have a protective order, you never have. It 
doesn't hold any weight in court because I've always beeli found innocent." TT 150: 
53(1-3). He also said referring to the protective order, "it doesn't hold a teardrop of 
water." TT 150: 53(3-5). 
Samuel said that Denier's call frightened her. She stated that the tone of his 
voice was threatening, harassing and angry. Samuel testified that although she did 
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not have the recorded message anymore she had a "written recollection" of the 
incident. TT 150: 54 (11, 22) 55 (3) & 59(13). 
Samuel called the police. Salt Lake City Police Office Degraw responded. TT 
150: 68(2-3). DeGraw listened to the message that was left on Samuel's telephone. 
TT 150: 69(1). 
DeGraw transcribed that telephone message as part of the police report of the 
incident. TT 150: 70(9). Per DeGraw, the message indicated that the caller "knew 
the telephone conversation was being recorded. He [the caller] was talking about 
the complaints that had been filed over the last eight or nine years, and that they'd 
all been found false, or his words were that they were found innocent, not guilty. He 
[the caller] was talking; he did talk about 'this is about our son, not about you, not 
about me." TT 150: 70(2-7). 
DeGraw stated that there was no statement or message regarding visitation. TT 
150: 71(5-9). The Officer also described the speaker's tone on the message as 
contemptuous. TT 150: 70 (22). Further, he stated that he "didn't see anything on 
[Samuel's] voice-mail that would allow [Samuel] to edit that message." TT 150: 
75(10-11). 
Denier stated that he saw his son every Monday and every other Wednesday 
and that there was not a precise custody arrangement during the holiday. TT 150: 
96(17-19, 20-21). When he did not have custody Denier would talk to his son 
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several times a month. Denier would call his son on his c^ll phone. TT 150: 97(1-8, 
14-17). 
Denier has left messages prior to this incident on Samuel's voicemail. TT 150: 
102(8). Denier stated he called his son's friend's father, $am, when he was not able 
to contact his son. TT 150: 98(15-20) & 99 (3-6). Denier stated that Samuel had 
called him twice on December 30, 2007. TT 150:100(l-l|8). 
Denier agreed that the parties had a protective ordgr (TT 150:101(2) & 108: 
(13-14)), and that the protective order allowed contact v\rtth respect to visitation. TT 
150:101(5-10). Denier admitted that during one of his calls he had spoken "with 
Sam and wanted to know where they were and I was ups^t that [Samuel] never told 
me that they left the state for the holidays and I had a right to know that." TT 150: 
108(13-14). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The statements were properly admitted as it was r^ ot hearsay. Even assuming 
arguendo that the statements were hearsay they were properly admitted under a 
long established exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 804 (]3) (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding questions 
regarding the visitation order as it did not pertain to the protective order violation 
and thus not relevant pursuant to Rule 401 and 402 of th£ Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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The trial court did not err in denying the defense motion to dismiss for 
insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the prosecution's case as there was 
sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury for deliberation. 
Finally, any error, if any with regard to questions regarding the visitation 
order, was cured when Denier testified regarding the visitation order. TT 150: 96 
[17-19, 20-21) & 97 [1-8,14-17). 
Denier has failed to show as required that there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
result more favorable to him if the hearsay statements had been excluded. "... 
Moreover, even if the court erred in admitting the challenged evidence, "we will only 
reverse if this error was harmful, 'i.e., if absent the error there is a reasonable 
likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant/" State v. Blubaugh, 904 
P.2d 688, 699 [Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 [Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) [in turn quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 [Utah 1993)). 
Given the totality of the evidence presented, there exists no reasonable likelihood 
that the verdict would have been more favorable to the Defendant absent the 







I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED OFFICER DEGRAW'S 
TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE RECORDED MESSAGE. 
The statements that were recorded and which DeGlraw heard when he 
responded to Samuel's residence is admissible and the trial court properly admitted 
it. Notwithstanding the fact that the record is silent as to what under what hearsay 
exception, if any, they were admitted under and although^ the defense did not 
request specificity, the trial court could have properly admitted the statements 
under at least two separate prongs (a) that the statements were not hearsay as they 
were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted and even if was hearsay 
(b) the statement were admissible as Statement against interest 
(a) The recorded statement was not hearsay 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prc^ ve truth of the matter 
asserted. Utah Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rule of Evidence. "When statements are 
made not to prove the truth of the statement but to prove the statement was made, 
it is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter ass0rted." Defense opening 
brief. pl3 citing Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2000 UT App 244 "If an out-of-court 
statement is "offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it 
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is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule/" Id. citing State v. 
Olsen, 860 P.2d 335 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a threatening statement to a victim 
that he was dead if he testified the next day, in a witness tampering case, was not 
hearsay as the statement was not offered to prove the truth of the statement but 
simply that the statement was made violating the statute. State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 
512, 514 (Utah 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 958,102 S. Ct. 1469 (1982). 
The court in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983), held that the 
defendant statement to a bystander, "I will kill you," to deter him from helping the 
police was not hearsay as it was not offered to prove the truth of the assertion. 
In this instance the prosecution did not elicit the statements from DeGraw to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Instead the statements were elicited to show 
that there were statements left on Samuel's telephone. 
Further, the present matter involves a charge of Violation of Protective 
Order: the allegation that Denier had made contact with Samuel in violation of a 
valid protective order. The protective order allowed limited telephone contact 
between the parties to discuss visitation: absent from these statements is a 
discussion regarding visitation. Thus, the statements were not elicited to prove 
what was said but what was not said. 
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(b1 Statement against interest 
Assuming arguendo that this court determines that the statements that 
Degraw heard is hearsay, this hearsay meets the requirements of Statement against 
interest pursuant to an established exception to the hearsay rule. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (3) reads: 
Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
Statement against interest A statement withj at the time of its making 
so far contrary to the declarant pecuniary ot proprietary interest, or so 
far tended to subject the declarant to civil oif criminal liability, or to 
render invalid a claim by the declarant agairist another, that a 
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose 
the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused 
is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate 
the trustworthiness of the statement 
The statement against interest exception, as with 1^1 other exception under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804, initially requires the unavailability of the declarant. 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5; and Utah Rule of Evidence $04. Denier, the defendant 
in this case, meets the definition of unavailability pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 
804 (a) (1) as he "exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant'^ statement[.]" See also 
State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108,1113 (Utah 1989), as Denier cannot be compelled to 
testify against himself. 
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The statements that DeGraw heard were that he "knew the telephone 
conversation was being recorded. He [the caller] was talking about the complaints 
that had been filed over the last eight or nine years, and that they'd all been found 
false, or his words were that they were found innocent, not guilty. He [the caller] 
was talking; he did talk about 'this is about our son, not about you, not about me" 
[TT 150:71 [6-7), was against his penal interest. 
Samuel's testimony at the trial prior to Degraw testifying provided 
corroboration that was trustworthy as she had heard the statements herself, she 
knew Denier for fourteen years, had spoken to him numerous time and knew his 
voice. In addition, Samuel had caller ID. Further, DeGraw had testified that the 
telephone machine where the message had been left did not allow it to be edited 
further ensuing trustworthiness. TT 150: 52 [20-22), 53 [1-7,10) & 75 [10-11). 
II. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE VISITATION ORDER WAS NOT 
RELEVANT 
Questions regarding the visitation order were not relevant and the trial court 
did not err when it excluded such questioning. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence Utah's appellate court has held that it will not overturn 
the court's determination unless it's an "abuse of discretion." State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232 [Utah 1991) citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,120 [Utah 1989). See also 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 [Utah Ct. App. 1991) cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 
[Utah 1991). 
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In the case at bar, the transcript of the part of the proceeding dealing with this 























Do you and Catherine, doe^ she ever call you about 
issues not related to Conner? 
Well she has-
Objection. 
That doesn't sound relevant counsel, I'll sustain it. 
Do you ever leave message^ on her answering 
machine? 
Yes I have. 
Have you done that before*^ 
Yes, sure I have. 
Has Catherine ever called you to go out to dinner? 
Objection. 
Yes. 
Counsel again, I'll sustain that objection. Strike it. It's 
not relevant. 
Do you recall what your visitation was, the order, on 
December 30th? Do you reckll if you could see him for 
the holidays specifically? 
Objection, I'm not sure in tfye relevance in that either? 
I'm sorry? 
I'm not sure the relevance ih that? 
I think it's absolutely relevant if he should have had 
custody of Conner while they were in Colorado. 
Um, let me have you approach counsel. 
What we are worried about) here is a protective order 
violation, what difference dtaes it make if she should 
[have] left the child with hiijn or not? 
Because in-
Go ahead. 
I think it absolutely goes to her credibility about 
whether this incident happened whether this 
recording of the time, um, I think that um, it goes as 
she said that she was feeling aroused by him after this 
phone conversation she was harassed, but I think we 
have evidence that she had been contacting him off 
and on, she felt threatened 1^1 of this and that this 
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message left her threatened and that it was related to, 
we have evidence that she was calling him out, was 
she threatened when she was calling? 
JUDGE: The question is was, was-
ATD: The question I asked was whether or not he had 
visitation, if he called and left a message and was 
looking for her it wasn't for harassment and it wasn't 
violating the protective order, it was related to their 
son and where he was at. 
JUDGE: (inaudible) if he called her during this time and asked 
her about visitation, if the voice mail he left her had 
something to do with that I think it's appropriate. See 
that's what we're worried about. So if he, if he can 
remember that he called left a voice mail and the 
voice mail was her I think I should have him or- I'd let 
you ask that. 
ATD: Okay. 
ATP: Okay. 
T.T 150:102 (1-22), 150:103 (1-22) & 150: 104 (1-4). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as: 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
And Utah Rule of Evidence 402 reads as follows: 
Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable 
in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible. 
15 
Applying the standard set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 401 and 402, the 
trial court properly determined that the visitation order was irrelevant in this 
instance as it did not pertain to the violation of the protective order; as the message 
left on Samuel telephone did not discuss visitation or custody and thus, inadmissible 
pursuant to Rule 402 of the Utah Rule of Evidence. 
As previously stated the trial court is well within it|s discretion to exclude 
information it considered irrelevant. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 
1991J; State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989). In this instance, the trial court 
determined that the visitation order, if any, had no bearing on Denier violating the 
protective order. 
Finally, any error, if any, was cured when Denier testified that he had 
visitation every Wednesday and every other weekend. T.T. 150: 96 (17-18). Denier 
had also testified "[a]nd holiday, it's uh. um. I believe it's once or twice out of the 
year as far as holidays are concerned: not real precise on that but, we, we just spent 
December together." TT 150: 96 (20-22). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED DENIER'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CITY'S CASE 
The trial court did not err when it denied Denier motion to dismiss at the 
conclusion of the City's case. The defense asserted that "there's insufficient 
evidence to go forward and um, put this to a jury" TT 150|: 86 (19-20). In essence 
the defense moved for a directed verdict. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
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Montoya, 2004 UT 5, said, "[I]n reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed 
verdict based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we will uphold the trial 
court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be 
reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." citing State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 [Utah 1989). 
Thus, a trial court may deny a motion for directed verdict if the trial court 
finds that the prosecution has established a "prima facie case against the defendant 
by producing "believable evidence of all of the elements of the crime charged. State 
v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, citing State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 [Utah 1992) 
[quoting State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 [Utah 1983)). The High Court then stated 
that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to prosecution, citing 
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, P16. 
The defense argued the following in support of its motion to dismiss: 
"we have an officer that testified [in] his opinion he didn't think it 
was a protective order violation um. [Additionally she called him 
twice before and then um, he called her back, and there was 
testimony that my client said this is regarding, the, the child. [T]his is 
about our son Connor." 
TT 105:86 [14-18). 
The trial court responded: 
"there's certain things that I think make the case worthy. Number 
one she admitted to calling Mr. Denier uh, twice before, as you say, 
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but on the other hand there's nothing that I'm aware that keeps her 
form calling him. Of course, the order prohibits Mr. Denier from 
calling her. Um sand so I suppose the jury can decide, well it's hardly 
fair to convict the defendant of the crime ^vhen she may have 
precipitated it. But on the other hand there's nothing illegal about 
her calling him, just him calling her. And, and the call itself the officer 
said, and we heard the conversation from both the memory of both 
the officer and the complaining witness; It didn't have anything to 
do about visitation. [I]t wasn't like can I pjck him up at 10.00 or, or, 
can I have him this weekend, it was- the officer did say there was 
reference, this isn't about you and me this is about our son, but the 
gist of the conversation uh, the officer recalled was that Mr. denier 
said, uh, this protective order isn't worth much um, we're tried 
before and it hasn't worked-the gist of thq conversation really 
focused on the protective order as opposed to visitation so, I deny 
the motion. 
TT 105:86 (21-22) 87: (1-16). 
The trial court in this instance found that there was evidence to submit the 
case to the jury. Thus, the trial court correctly denied the defense motion as "[i]f 
there is any evidence, however slight or circumstantial, which tends to show guilt of 
the crime charged or any of its degrees, it is the trial court's duty to submit the case 
to the jury." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 237 (Utah 1991). 
NO ERRORS OCCURRED AND THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
THE DEFENDANT 
The trial court correctly ruled and no errors exist. Further, there was 
sufficient evidence to convict Denier and so the jury verdict in this matter should 
not be set aside. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the "it will review the evidence in 
support of a verdict for sufficiency, however that standard of review is very 
narrow." State v. Rooker, 709 P.2d 342 (1985). The Rooker court stated: 
We review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
citing State v. Petree, Utah 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v. McCardell, 
652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982). 
The High Court then said that they will not substitute they judgment for that 
of the jury. And added that, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime 
can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. Id. 
An appellate court will reverse only when the evidence, so viewed is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175 citing State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
337, 343 (Utah 1997) quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
Further as a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court 
assumes that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict. In State v. 
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, the court stated, "[W]e will reverse a jury verdict only 
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when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence to support the verdict was 
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust, citing State v. Silva, 2000 UT 2^2 P13. 
Given the totality of the evidence presented in this instance, there exists no 
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been fayorable to the Defendant 
absent the introduction into evidence of the challenged statements. The cumulative 
evidence in this case was sufficient such that the admission of the hearsay 
statements is unlikely to have affected the outcome of thei verdict. See First Gen. 
Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480,485 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "'[E]ven if we were to 
conclude that the evidence here was improperly admitted that would not decide the 
issue. We still would have to determine whether the erroit was harmful.'" Id., quoting 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). In thepresent case, the 
cumulative evidence against Denier was such that the jurjf would have rendered the 
same decision even if the hearsay statements had been excluded. 
Again, Utah Appellate court have held that they "v\te will not overturn the 
trial court's decision regarding admissibility of evidence Unless it was an abuse of 
discretion.... Moreover, even if the court erred in admitting the challenged evidence, 
"we will only reverse if this error was harmful, 'i.e., if absent the error there is a 
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to th0 defendant' 
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State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting State v. White, 
880 P.2d 18, 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (in turn quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1221 (Utah 1993)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff/Appellee respectfully requests that this 
court affirm the trial court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 31* day of August, 2009. 
Padraa Veeru-Collings V 
Seniority Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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